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Emerging linguistic evidence points at disordered language behavior as a defining char-
acteristic of schizophrenia. In this article, we review this literature and demonstrate how 
a framework focusing on two core functions of language—reference and propositional 
meaning—can conceptualize schizophrenic symptoms, identify important variables for 
risk assessment, diagnosis, and treatment, and inform cognitive behavioral therapy and 
other remedial approaches. We introduce the linguistic phenomena of deictic anchoring 
and propositional complexity, explain how they relate to schizophrenic symptoms, and 
show how they can be tracked in language behavior.
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LANGUAGe AND tHOUGHt iN scHiZOPHreNiA
Human thought is best expressed through language output. No other type of behavior is able to 
capture its complexity with as little ambiguity or effort. It is therefore no surprise that primary 
symptoms of schizophrenia, in particular thought disorder and delusions, are inseparable from, 
and characterized by, linguistic behavior. Thought disorder is characterized and diagnosed by “dis-
ordered speech” (1), and it is through language that delusional thought is expressed. Schizophrenia 
appears to be associated with specific language profiles (2–7), particularly with semantic impair-
ment in thought disorder and poverty and disruption of grammatical structure in schizophrenia at 
large. Moreover, the demonstration premorbidly of linguistic deviation may predict the transition 
to psychosis in high-risk individuals (8, 9). Language integrates a wide range of cognitive functions: 
perception, mind-reading, intention, memory, executive functioning, prediction, and motor control. 
This integration of cognitive systems has long been seen to be important in psychotic disorders. For 
instance, Bleuler believed that a “disorder of associations” between cognitive functions may underlie 
schizophrenia (10). Thus, failure of one or several of these cognitive processes, or their integration, 
may engender the symptoms of schizophrenia and may be revealed by language. The contention that 
schizophrenia presents with a disorder of language is supported by biological evidence: language 
draws from a large, connected network that extends well beyond Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas and 
includes right hemisphere and subcortical structures, including striatal areas which are relevant 
for motor speech control, semantic and grammatical processes (11), and which are affected in 
schizophrenia (12, 13). The white matter tracts which support language function are also involved 
in other aspects of cognition including memory and executive function (14) and are abnormal in 
schizophrenia (15). Genes that mediate linguistic behavior are associated with schizophrenia (16); 
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a polymorphism in the FOXP2 gene for instance associates with 
schizophrenia (17), with poverty of speech, and possibly with 
auditory verbal hallucinations (18, 19).
In this article, we introduce one approach to use the tools of 
linguistics to help identify specific language variables which may 
advance clinical practice both in diagnosis and in intervention. 
Despite early associations with aphasia (20), there are substantial 
differences between associated symptoms (21, 22). In particular, 
processing verb argument structure, affixation, or retrieval of 
complex, rare, and/or abstract words appear comparatively intact 
in schizophrenia.
There has been much attention to single word processing 
in schizophrenia, especially with regards to semantic priming. 
Priming refers to the phenomenon that the response to a word 
(e.g., “cat”) is faster when preceded by a related word (e.g., the 
semantically related “dog,” or phonologically related “mat”). 
This priming effect has been repeatedly shown to be enhanced 
in schizophrenia, with evidence of increase in thought disorder 
(23, 24). One pharmacological study has shown that priming 
effects are subject to dopaminergic modulation (25). It has been 
argued that enhanced priming in schizophrenia is consequent on 
increased automatic spreading of activation in the lexical–seman-
tic system (26). Language production too provides evidence for 
pathological activation patterns: in a verbal fluency task (“name as 
many animals as you can”), people with schizophrenia and their 
unaffected siblings produced more words than controls and the 
words were, semantically, more closely related (27). These studies 
have provided valuable insight into possible disruptions of neural 
connectivity, especially in the lexicon. Because words are consid-
ered very basic units in language, it may be tempting to assume 
that they lie at the basis of language processing. However, word 
selection occurs in tandem with selection of grammatical frames, 
and as a result, processing of words in such isolation is virtually 
absent from natural language use. Words appear in grammatical 
and communicational contexts. We will focus on grammar, and 
in particular two inherent aspects of language structure: deictic 
anchoring and propositional meaning.
In this article, we treat language primarily as an indicator of 
mental health issues. We acknowledge that cognitive processes in 
schizophrenia are atypical in non-verbal domains, as experiments 
on prepulse inhibition (28, 29) and visual processing (30), among 
other work, suggest. However, we take seriously the possibility 
that language contributes to shaping higher level thought. In 
our discussion of behavioral intervention toward the end of the 
article, we make assumptions that treating language use could at 
least influence the way thought is structured.
As a final note of introduction, people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia form a highly heterogeneous group even when 
grouped according to symptom labels. In this paper which aims 
to introduce new perspectives, it is impossible to do justice to the 
entire spectrum. It will take more empirical work to test the ideas 
described herein.
Deictic ANcHOriNG
Deictic anchoring is an inherent part of the process by which we 
make references to aspects in the world including entities, events, 
locations, and time. Consider a news report about a road traffic 
incident in which the reporter says: “A jeep crashed into a barrier.” 
The meaning is deictically anchored firstly by references to enti-
ties, e.g., “a jeep” or “a barrier,” and we know from the context that 
it is one particular jeep and one particular barrier (as opposed 
to the same phrase in the generic statement “a jeep is a type of 
car”). The event (“crashed”) is anchored in time as being in the 
past relative to the speech act. Healthy deictic anchoring further 
expands to having a sense of who the speaker is and who that 
speaker is addressing. As a listener, I know that the reporter is not 
talking about a car crash I had last year and that she is not talking 
exclusively to me.
Psychotic episodes have been reframed as a disruption 
of deictic anchoring (31). With regard to our example news 
report, someone with disturbed deictic anchoring may believe 
that the reporter is directly and specifically talking to him or 
her about a car accident that (s)he experienced last year. Such 
self-referential beliefs are characteristic of schizophrenia (1). 
Thoughts too are anchored to who is thinking them and to 
what they relate. Under that framework thought control and 
thought insertion (someone else thinks my thoughts), thought 
broadcast (my private thoughts are accessed by someone else), 
and auditory verbal hallucinations (in which my own language 
is perceived as the speech of someone else which is directed at 
me or about me) can be conceptualized as a disruption of deictic 
anchoring (31, 32).
Such a disruption would manifest in language behavior. Crucial 
deictic information is conveyed in nouns or noun phrases, e.g., “a 
man” and “that red car.” Pronouns also serve deictic anchoring. 
Fineberg et al. (33) found increased first-person (self-referential) 
pronoun use in psychosis. In another study, pronoun use also 
distinguished people with schizophrenia from people with 
mood disorder (34). Watson et  al. found that, in people with 
high genetic loading for schizophrenia, participants who transi-
tion to schizophrenia can be predicted by their increased use of 
second-person pronouns (9). This linguistic profile was stable at 
two separate assessments 18  months apart and predated other 
diagnostic symptoms.
PrOPOsitiONAL MeANiNG
For linguistic structures to be complete, deictic anchoring must 
be used to form propositions. Propositions are statements about 
the world which can be true or false. They form the basis of 
human reasoning and determine our views, selfhood, and 
actions. In linguistic behavior, propositions emerge in complete 
sentences (or clauses). A noun such as “jeep,” by itself, is not 
propositional. It refers to a general concept, but it contains no 
statement. Which jeep? What happened, is happening, or will 
happen to it? Does it even exist? It is the full sentence, in a 
context, that forms a proposition. “A jeep crashed into a barrier” 
establishes a topic/subject (“a jeep”) and makes a conceptually 
verifiable statement about it.
Increasing propositional complexity correlates with increasing 
grammatical complexity. Consider the sentences “Sarah realizes 
that a jeep crashed into a barrier” and “Sarah thinks that a jeep 
crashed into a barrier.” Each of these sentences contains an 
3Zimmerer et al. Language in Schizophrenia
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 17
embedded clause, e.g., “[Sarah realizes [that a jeep crashed into a 
barrier]]” (square brackets indicate clauses, one of which is here 
hierarchically embedded in another). The embedded content is 
dependent on the verb in the superordinate clause. Mental state 
verbs can be categorized as factive (e.g., “realize,” “regret,” and 
“know”) or non-factive (e.g., “believe,” “think,” and “assume”). 
For a factive sentence such as “Sarah realizes that a jeep crashed 
into a barrier” to be true, the jeep must have crashed into a barrier 
and Sarah must be certain about it. For the non-factive sentence, 
“Sarah thinks that a jeep crashed into the barrier” to be true, it 
does not actually matter whether the accident happened. Only 
Sarah’s representation of the world is important. Other types 
of embedding infer causality (“because”) or temporal relation-
ships (“after”). Clausal embedding, and to a smaller degree the 
juxtaposition of clauses (e.g., connecting clauses with “and” or 
“or”), introduce complex relationships between propositions. 
Kuperberg (7) notes that in people with schizophrenia, cortical 
activity to semantic abnormalities in sentences is particularly 
small compared to controls if interpretation requires integration 
of several sentences.
Delusions and thought disorder can be considered disruptions 
of propositional meaning. The affected individual considers as 
true propositions that others would reject with certainty, or, 
if thought disordered, may altogether lose the ability to form 
coherent propositions. A reduced capacity to entertain complex 
propositions in schizophrenia may underlie formal thought 
disorder and the generation of delusions (32).
Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks, including those in studies show-
ing ToM impairment in schizophrenia, commonly make use of 
non-factive embedding [e.g., “When John comes back for his 
cigarettes, how many does he think he has left?” (35)]. In child 
development, a relationship between emergence of clause 
embedding and ToM ability has been proposed (36). Similarly, 
impaired ToM in schizophrenia (37) may be related to decreased 
language complexity. Propositional complexity may also distin-
guish prodromal stage overvalued ideas (38) from delusions. 
The former turn out to be more complex [e.g., the non-factive 
embedding in “[People look confusing] … [they’re almost like 
[they’re made up]]” (39)], while delusional statements can be 
simpler [e.g., “[I have a million dollars]” (40)]. Klaus Conrad 
described the onset of a delusion as the loss of ability to tran-
scend an experience and see it with the eyes of others (41). At a 
linguistic level, this cognitive restructuring can be described as a 
loss of propositional complexity.
In thought disorder, the ability to express coherent propositions 
can be severely impaired. Sentences are structurally incomplete, 
abandoned by the speaker, or contain grammatical errors which 
severely hinder their interpretation. “Anna” is a 58-year-old 
lady with a 30-year history of treatment resistant schizophrenia 
characterized by severe thought disorder, affective incongruity, 
low motivation, poor self care, and delusions of grandeur. In the 
following excerpt, the therapist probes after she says that she 
worked as a judge:
Therapist: You were working as a judge?
Anna: Yes.
Therapist: Whereabouts did you work as a judge?
Anna: England.
Therapist: In England.
Anna: Judge Supreme, agnostic, when I left, and move 
into the royal. Biggest judge in the world.
The patient’s final statement does not contain a single complete 
clause. “Judge Supreme” and “agnostic” are a noun and an adjec-
tive, respectively, produced in grammatical isolation. “When I 
left” is a dependent clause and as such cannot be interpreted if 
not connected to another clause (e.g., “[She was still there [when 
I left]]”). “Move into the royal” is not a clause since it is missing its 
subject. We can speculate that this subject could be the preceding 
pronoun “I,” but in this case, the verb would lack a past tense 
marker (“moved”). “Biggest judge in the world” is a complex, but 
isolated, noun phrase. Propositions are difficult to extract under 
such circumstances. Note that Anna is a severe case and that the 
majority of individuals with thought disorder will not present 
disruptions of such degree.
tHe LiNGUistics OF BeHAviOrAL 
iNterveNtiON
We have discussed how language behavior can contribute to 
identifying the risk of developing schizophrenia and how it is 
essential to detecting schizophrenic symptoms. In this section, 
we wish to discuss language as a mediator of cognitive change in 
schizophrenia, especially in talk-based therapies such as cogni-
tive behavioral therapy. Language is the medium through which 
the therapist puts a patient’s thought process and assertions into 
focus with a view to being reframed (42). Moreover, we consider 
here whether cognitive restructuring can occur as a consequence 
of the therapist helping the patient to change their language 
behavior, for instance, by first establishing coherent deictic 
anchoring and propositional meaning. This is crucial, since 
without deictic anchoring, no meaningful interaction is possible, 
and without propositional meaning, there is literally nothing to 
discuss. Going back to Anna, we can see the therapist trying to 
form propositions on the basis of her structurally impoverished 
output. The therapist is inquiring about a process she calls “sight 
and mind painting”:
Therapist: What does the sight and mind painting involve?
Anna: Ah, you can do it on the camera, on the chair and 
the top of a … a door, say, yes, flown in by radar.
Therapist: So you put together a composition …
Anna: Yes.
Therapist: And it’s passed by radar.
Anna: Yes.
Therapist: And … how does the radar work? Is there any kind 
of equipment?
Anna: Yeah, yeah, I’m not sure about that.
Therapist: So there might be equipment? Right?
Anna: Yeah.
Therapist: So how, how do you process it, you’ve got that 
composition there …
Anna: There are, there have canvasses, down in 
London and somehow, I see what I’m looking 
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at, that becomes a painting. The painting is then 
transferred.
Therapist: The canvasses down in London, somehow your 
composition is transferred there?
Treatment of delusions can involve turning the delusional 
assertion (“I am John the Baptist”) into a non-delusional one 
(“I feel I am John the Baptist”). The introduction of complexity 
loosens the force of the cognitive distortion and represents 
the delusion not simply as fact but as a content for possible 
denial and scrutiny. There is corresponding work in depres-
sion: Zinken et  al. (43) found that the complexity of clausal 
connectivity and embedding was a significant predictor for 
how well a depressed individual would respond to therapy. The 
authors assumed that richer grammatical systems represented 
the individual’s ability to not just maintain simple negative 
propositions (“[I feel bad] [and I can’t sleep]”) but to put 
them into a context that would allow further insight (“[I feel 
bad [because I can’t sleep]]”) and thereby cope or even gain 
control over their negative thought processes. Syntactic prim-
ing, the tendency to reproduce specific language structures 
that one is exposed to (44, 45), suggests that the therapist’s 
language use may be critical. A three-step linguistic therapy 
model therefore emerges to (i) establish deictic anchoring, (ii) 
establish propositional meaning, and (iii) increase proposi-
tional complexity. This notion requires the traditional belief 
that language is simply a way of expressing thought to be 
challenged; it relies instead on a more nuanced understand-
ing of a closer interdependence of thought and language (46). 
It also requires rigorous testing. It needs to be determined 
whether it is possible for therapists to increase the complex-
ity of the language used to report the delusional beliefs, and 
whether such a linguistic change will reduce the resistance 
of the delusion to disconfirmatory bias. Finally, the language 
variables relevant to predicting and identifying schizophrenia 
may serve as outcome variables which track cognitive change 
as the result of behavioral or pharmacological interventions.
tOWArD A cOGNitive PrOFiLe OF 
scHiZOPHreNic sYMPtOMs
Language has become a new frontier in clinical research, not only 
in schizophrenia but also in other pathologies such as dementias 
(47, 48). Language variables can be obtained non-invasively and 
without requirement for expensive technologies. Their analysis 
can be automated (8, 49, 50). They are quantitative and continu-
ous, and may reveal subtle cognitive signs long before recognized 
onset. It appears that the variables that most critically inform 
diagnosis and support therapy vary from pathology to pathology. 
In the case of schizophrenia, noun phrase use and degrees and 
types of clausal combination and embedding appear particularly 
relevant. Linguistic research should be used to complement 
research on other cognitive processes such as memory, attention, 
inhibition, and visual perception.
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